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Honneth on Reification 
 
In this seminar I want to look at Axel Honneth’s recent Tanner Lectures on reification in a 
recognition-theoretical framework. In the context of the series of “Denkanstoesse” I must say 
at the outset that the relation between German and Austrian developments in literature and 
philosophy since 1945 will not be my concern, but what I will do is consider developments in 
critical theory – so the German, more specifically Frankfurt, side, and what is surely one of 
the dominant discourses in the last 60 years. 
As we know, that discourse is actually quite a bit older, and dates from the interbellum, with 
Horkheimer’s seminal essay on critical and traditional theory. In the work of Honneth, whom 
I take for the moment as the current diadoche of the school, after Horkheimer, Adorno, and 
Habermas, we find a return to these days of the beginning of the Frankfurter Schule, a period 
extremely fertile in philosophical ideas. If I were to attempt to describe the development of 
critical theory between the 1930s and today, I would highlight a movement from a 
fundamental criticism of enlightenment rationalism as inevitably entrapped, or leading to, 
irrational barbarism because of the way in which rationalism denies that in reality which 
escapes the grip of the concept (and therefore is ultimately necessarily instrumental), through 
a phase, of which Habermas is the key figure, in which this totalising critique of reason which 
in the end fires back on itself (Die Postnationale Konstellation) is replaced by an idea of 
critical theory as the development of a discourse ethics in which the communicative basis of 
rationality is posed against the instrumentalising tendencies of rationality in history, to 
Honneth’s theorie der Anerkennung, recognition, which tries to show that the understanding 
of communicative rationality as Habermas developed it remains tied to a more or less 
instrumental conception of rationality, or of interpersonal communication (because what is at 
stake there are the reasons we have for our actions and views) and needs to be replaced by a 
more fundamental analysis of intersubjective recognition which would bring to light that prior 
to any rational exchange or rational discourse about the legitimacy of our claims, there is an 
affective disclosure of the world and of others, without which communication cannot be 
understood, without which communicative rationality cannot be understood and without 
which even the totalising critique of reason of the earlier Frankfurter Schule, especially 
Adorno’s negative dialektik, cannot be understood either.  Thus, the development of the 
Frankfurter Schule takes on the characteristics of a series of attempts to find adequate 
foundations for a critical appreciation of social and political practice, in which in earlier ideas 
are taken up in subsequent attempts to show that the earlier ideas were not fundamental 
enough. This characteristic stands in marked opposition to the anti-foundationalism that we 
have seen for a long time, a period which seems to be behind us now – and which in academic 
circles was called postmodernism. The resurgence of interest in the developments in the 
Frankfurt school seems to fit with the demise of postmodernism. 
 
In the Tanner lectures, Honneth returns to one of the classical figures of pre-war Marxism, 
Georg Lukacs, an author, however, who never was part of the Frankfurt school. The same 
goes for the other authors he brings into proximity with Lukacs, Heidegger and Dewey. 
Lukacs gave the classical statement of the idea of reification, Verdinglichung. That idea has 
origins which go back to German idealism – to the idea that the world is, in some sense, 
epistemologically, creatively or processually connected to or dependent on the activity of the 
subject. In a way, the Kantian critique of metaphysics is a critique of the reification, 
objectification, of what is in the end a constitutive achievement of the subject - what we 
thought was independent of us and “out there” actually turns out to be intimately connected to 
our own constitution. In Fichte this idea is taken to its first absolute idealist statement, and in 
Schelling we find the classical statement of reification: “forgetting the process over the 
product.” But also for Kant, metaphysics is a kind of forgetting – forgetting the constitutive 
activity of the subject as far as knowledge is concerned. Of course, and Honneth makes this 
very clear, for Lukacs our tendency to treat as a sphere of detached objects what is in fact a 
sphere of practical, emphatic and engaged involvement, results from the structure of 
capitalism. Because of the principle of commodity exchange which determines the economy, 
we acquire the habit of treating everything in our world – including our relations to others – as 
things, essentially disconnected from our innermost concerns and identities. The objective 
gaze of science and commodity exchange are akin. [quotation 96/7, A] 
 
Honneth aks himself to what extent this notion of reification (and the notion of alientation is 
closely related to it) is of value today. He points out the many elements in contemporary 
discourse which seem related to it in some way: 1) literature invoking an aura of the “creeping 
commercialisation of everyday life” (e.g. Houllebecq, Jelinek, Silke Scheuermann); 2) an 
increasing tendency in society to pretend we have certain feeling, which in the end leads to an 
inability to distinguish between the real and the feigned – “emotional self-manipulation”, the 
“prostitution of experience and beliefs” that Lukacs held journalism to exemplify; 3) ethical 
or moral discourse (e.g. Nussbaum) talking about the objectification of people and personal 
relations; 4) the apparent appropriateness of using the concept of reification to analyse the 
contemporary social role and implication of brain research:  [quotation 94 B] 
 
In his analysis of reification in the work Lukacs, Honneth is, in my view, essentially 
concerned to show that the reasons Lukacs was dismissed by the early Frankfurt school are 
false and that, if we divest Lukacs of his idealist metaphysics, we are left with the bare fact 
that an affective disposition towards a world and others with which we are connected always 
precedes an objectifying, comtemplative (as Lukacs also calls it), neutral stance – in short, 
reification. As we know, for Lukacs, reification, or alienation, can never become total because 
human beings retain within themselves an experience of subjectivity – which is the other of 
reification – that cannot disappear simply because of who we are. There remains in Lukacs, 
certainly the early Lukacs, a romantic-revolutionary, idealist, pathos which he shared with 
Ernst Bloch, for a time his closest friend. This forms the basis of the critique of capitalism. As 
Honneth points out, for Lukacs, “all members of capitalist society” are being “socialized in 
the same manner into a reifying system of behaviour, so that the instrumental treatment of 
others initially represents a mere social fact, and not a moral wrong” (p. 100). But this can 
only mean that there is also a notion of “true human praxis”, moreover, one which is never 
totally eclipsed (this in contradistinction to Adorno: “Es gibt kein wahres Leben im 
Falschen”). Honneth describes it as follows: [quotation 101 C]. 
Lukacs grounded this idea of true praxis, however, in an idealist philosophy in which the 
object is thought of as the product of the subject, along Fichtean lines, which in Honneth’s 
view robs his ideas of “any chance of social-theoretical justification” – but, to be sure, for 
reasons distinct from the dismissal Lukacs had earlier received from Horkheimer and Adorno. 
Honneths also points to a connected naiveté in Lukacs, in that, with Habermas, we might say 
that he gravely underestimates the extent to which modern societies need “reified” structures 
of behaviour in the first place – behavioural structures which are, however prone to distortion, 
connected to the very project of emancipation from which Lukacs draws his inspiration.  
I must note there that the short presentation of idealism Honneth gives is quite tendentious, 
and, for example, completely ignores the fact that whereas Fichte entertained a radical idea of 
the constitution of objectivity by subjectivity, he also recognised that “das Bewusstsein des 
Individuums is notwendig von einem andern, dem eines Du, begleitet und nur unter dieser 
Bedingung moeglich” (Wissenschaftslehre 1797). Indeed, Honneth himself has investigated 
the traces of a theory of recognition back to Hegel’s Philosophie des Rechts. 
 
In the subsequent parts of the lecture, Honneth dispenses with the idealist basis of the 
rescuing of the fact of original affective engagement, the fact that we cannot “neutrally 
comprehend reality” – intersubjectivity – and seeks to align his Lukacsian inspiration to the 
philosophies of Heidegger and Dewey. Honneth recognises that Heidegger would not share 
Lukacs idea that the “privileging of the subject-object schema” can be related back tot eh 
capitalist form of society. He even says that Heidegger was completely alien to social-
theoretical consideration (!). For Heidegger, the basis of the analysis is a phenomenological 
one, namely the basic structure of Dasein he calls “Sorge”, and the distinction between 
Zuhandenheit and Vorhandenheit to which it gives rise. He also calls is “engaged activity” – 
in which “the subject no longer neutrally encounters a reality that still remains to be 
understood but is existentially interested in a reality that is always already disclosed as having 
qualitative significance. (…) Reification has not eliminated the other, nonreified form of 
praxis but merely concealed it from our awareness” (104-105). The “modus of existential 
engagement” (106) is primary and factually always already there. [quotation 107 D]. 
 
This engaged practice encompasses more than mere sensitivity to or respect for the 
perspective of the other – as we find it in Habermas’ discourse ethics – for that remains an 
instrumental interest. The caring disclosure of the world always precedes it in an “affective 
disposition, a positive predisposition” (p.108). [quotation E, 109]. 
I will leave out the consideration of Dewey. 
 
Honneth is now concerned to show that this phenomenological dimension of care, which he 
has equated with the sense of non-distorted, affectively engaged, positively pre-disposed, 
practice, or subjectivity, that Lukacs implicitly refers to in analysing the idea of reification, is 
both theoretically fundamental, and in all essential aspects equivalent to his idea of 
recognition, which has Hegelian roots. “Recognition comes before cognition” (p.  113) 
 
Honneth does this by showing that the objectifying stance is grounded in the existential 
engagement to the world, and in particular by showing that the communicative stance given 
by the ability to assume the perspective of a second person is grounded in “an antecedent 
interaction that bears the characteristic features of existential care”. 
 
From the consideration of validity and the structure of validity claims, we move to the genetic 
area and are reminded that the nine month revolution, in which  a child realises his caretaker 
has a perspective on the world just like he or she, and thus shares a world with others, is 
dependent on the child having emotionally attached to the caretaker [quotations F and G 
116/7] . An objective understanding of reality is acquired by a previous imitation, attachment, 
taking-over of the perspective of a loved one. The role of “love” here, or emotional 
attachement, lies in the fact that it implies, in distinction to epistemic attitudes, an “element of 
involuntary openness, devotedness”. In the ontogenesis, recognition precedes cognition. 
 
A third approach lies in the criticism of the problem of knowledge of other minds. Here 
Honneth addresses Cavell’s and Sartre’s ideas that the skeptic about knowledge of other 
minds can never be refuted unless we come to see that our relation to others, and their 
consciousness, is not primarily cognitive. We are affected ourrselves by the notion we take of 
the emotional states of others. Cavell speaks of sympathy – [quotation H1, H2; 121] This is 
not an empirical, or psychological point, but a categorical one – a particular class of 
utterances can only be understood from the stance Cavell calls “acknowledgement”. 123:”the 
acknowledgement of the other constitutes a non-epistemic prerequisite for linguistic 
understanding”.  And this involves more than understanding their reasons for acting , it 
encompasses an element of sympathy or care, it is more than what is normally called a 
“communicative stance”. 
Here I must note that although it is certainly true that Habermas emphasises the dimension of 
reasons for acting in communication, he is not entirely blind to this preceding level of 
recognition. In my view, we find here an idea that owes at least as much to Lukacs as to the 
tradition of dialogical philosophy, which also goes back to German idealism, and in which 
Buber’s Ich und Du is a central text. In the theory of communicative action, Buber is 
mentioned only once, in a footnote, but in an interesting place, namely where Habermas refers 
to the work in dialogue theory done by Skjervheim in the 50s. Skjervheim recognised that 
understanding meaning is a mode of experience (not cognition). I quote from TCA: “What is 
of interest for us is that meanings – the meaning of others people’s expressions and behaviour, 
the meanings of written and spoken words – must be regarded as belonging to that which is 
given.” (p. 164) understanding meaning differs from the perception of physical objects, in that 
it is preceded by an intersubjective relation to a second person, a “you”, a relation Habemas 
here explicitly calls, following Skjervheim, a “non objectifying relation”. Skjervheim affirms 
“the fundamental ambiguity of the human situation: that the other is there both as an object 
for me and as another subject with me. This dualism crops up in one of the major means of 
intercourse with the other – the spoken word. We may treat the words that the other utters as 
sounds merely; of if we understand their meaning we may still treat them as facts, registering 
the fact that he says what he says; or we may treat what he says as knowledge claim, in which 
case we are not concerned with what he says as a fact of his biography only, but as something 
which can be true or false. In both the first cases the other is an object for me, although in 
different ways, while in the latter he is a fellow-subject who concerns me as one on equal 
footing with myself, in that we are both concerned with our common world” (quoted in TCA, 
p. 166). Habermas even mentions that whereas Skjervheim places his analysis in the 
environment of the phenomenological analysis of intersubjectivity as given by Husserl (for 
whom intersubjectivity is in a sense derivative), his analysis is “actually closer to basic ideas 
of the philosophy of dialogue, going back to Buber and Rosenzweig” (n. 188). While the 
focus remains that of knowledge, the level of concern is implicitly recognised as preceding it. 
Habermas does not elaborate the point further and we may say that Honneth, in his work on 
recognition theory, has done so.  
 
Reification as forgetfulness of recognition. [quotation I, 125, as a resume] Honneth goes on to 
say that for Lukacs all objectification is reification. This leads to very unwelcome results, for 
surely the abiilityt o produce and use objective knowledge, cognition, is “rooted in 
recognition, and is not its opposite” (p. 126) – For Lukacs, reification is the result of a social 
process, one that can never become total because the genuine form of human behaviour is 
rooted deeply in who we are. But, as Honneth points out, the entire development of 
modernisation appears, for Lukacs, as a form of reification. Habermas made room for 
“reification” as the basic process of modernisation – the development of spheres of strategic 
action as opposed to communicative action. However, in the eyes of Honneth, he thereby 
placed the moral burden of proof on the domain of functional, strategic, reason which in 
practice means a criterion by which to judge the appropriateness of functinalisation cannot be 
given. 
 
Honneth then proposes to make a distinction between attitudes and practices in which we 
cognise while at the same time not having forgotten that our objective stance is rooted in an 
antecedent, non-cognitive stance of emphathetic engagement and recognition, and attitudes in 
practices in which we have forgotten the basis in recognition. There are “forms of knowledge 
sensitive to recognition” and “forms of knowledge in which every trace of their origin in an 
antecedent act of recognition has been lost” (p. 128). The former are not in opposition to 
conceptual thought – indeed they are the only way to understand the point of conceptual 
thought in the first place – and are rooted in the awareness of the gap between conceptual 
thought and the individual, affective, connected, realities and individuals they concern 
(Adorno). The latter form a stance in which we are no longer aware of the “feeling of 
connection” that is necessary for us to understand the expressions of others as making a claim 
to us that we react in an appropriate way (autism). 
 
But how is the forgetfulness of recognition possible in the first place? For Lukacs, it was easy 
to affirm a social cause – the market. But for Honneth this is no longer possible, as reification 
is not the opposite of recognition, but a specific type of relation between recognition and 
objectification. Honneth mentions two forms of forgetting of recognition:1) we get so 
absorbed in the independence of a practice or stance, we simply lose sight of its affective 
origin (the tennis player), 2) we entertain thought schemata which lead to a selective 
interpretation of practice (prejudice, denial). Interestingly, Honneth does not want to give an 
example, “because the case is so well known”--. 
 
Critical theory has been concerned for three decades with a normative consideration of society 
in the light of principles of justice. The theory of communicative action is concerned with the 
process of legitimisation of practices and knowledge- and normative claims. But as Honneth 
says, we have always known that societies can be normatively deficient in ways that have 
nothing to do with justice, and these are discussed in the public sphere under the various types 
of  “ethics” that we see today. The recourse to the concept of reification is intended as a way 
to do justice to the intuition of  Lukacs of the detrimental effects of a certain type of 
objectifying stance towards the world, and as a way to reformulate the concept in terms of  a 
theory of recognition which affirms the primacy of empathy, engagement, identification in the 
relation between persons and their world. Honneth tries to follow Lukacs even in a 
reinterpretation of the idea of a reification of nature, this time not grounded in a more or less 
romantic philosophy of nature, but in the idea that recognition of the other involved an 
attachment, or openness for, the other,  including a recognition of their subjective conceptions 
and feelings about non-human objects. This is the only basis Honneth sees for an 
environmental ethics, as the idea that the objectification of nature would harm the primacy of 
the caring stance seems closed off to us. We may consider whether Honneth’s assessement 
here is itself based on lingering subject-object dualism, or a dualism of society and nature – 
for why would we not include in the recognitional stance the physical, natural, sides of 
persons – they seem to belong as essentially to who we are, as our recognitional openness to 
others.  
 
But more importantly, I want to point out that the reinterpretation of reification as a forgetting 
of recognition when used as way to both continue and correct critical theory itself meets a 
number of problems: 
 
1. the analysis of care as the basic structure of Dasein, care understood as affective 
orientation on another, ultimately affirms a level of ontology, which appears as 
unrelated, and therefore always relevant, to any other social or psychological reality. 
In Honneth’s text we find an unreflected juxtaposition of empirical and categorical 
considerations, which could be read easily as a familiar move to obfuscated social 
realities by presenting them as “atemporal” (a word Honneth actually uses) states of 
affairs. This is what Heidegger does in Being and Time, and it is his answer to the 
question Honneth comes up with himself, but to which he has no really satisfactory 
answer, namely, how is Verfallenheit possible? For Adorno, this question does not 
arise in this way, because for him it is the very fact of the gap between concept and 
individual (the forgetting of that is identity thinking) which explains capitalism as well 
as the misleading discourse of Verfallenheit and, indeed, Anerkennung as rooted in a 
phenomenology of personal existence. Phenomenology itself retains its idealist, 
platonic, origin, and so does, we might argue, the recognition theory as developed by 
Honneth. What else than the realisation that our relations to others and to the world 
around us, the meaning of it, cannot be reduced to a general concept, is really given in 
this reformulation of reification, and what indeed, is that idea other than what Lukacs 
first raised  by introducing the concept of reification? For reification is not just the 
objectification of persons or things, but with that necessarily also their equalisation, 
their complete subsumption under a category or kind (fascism). While Honneth may 
guard us against that trap, and indeed give us a handle on showing where our 
institutions are becoming “fascist” in the way they go about their business, there is 
little critical potential in a notion of reification that does not lay out the horizon of the 
full implication of recognition of the other (to limit myself to the interpersonal 
domain). Honneth’s understanding of recognition remains tied to existing form of 
interpersonal relations, in a way, it reduces recognition to a social or socio-cultural 
relation and that is the price he has to pay for reinterpreting reification as a forgetting 
of recognition. For, along Lukacs original lines and, indeed, Adorno’s, it is essential 
most of all to not forget that we do not know yet what recognition of the other might, 
could or should be. That messianic dimension is certainly present in Lukacs and also 
in Adorno, and it is a constitutive for meaning as the interpersonal, Ich-Du relation – 
which indeed itself can also be only understood properly when we do not lose sigh of 
its future-oriented dimension. When we do, to return briefly to Kant, we fail to see the 
infinite implication in the notion of human dignity, which cannot be reduced to the 
primordial openness to other at the basis of cognition. And when we do that, and I 
submit this is the structure of Honneth’s reinterpretation of reficiation, we lose the 
insight, as Adorno says in the Jargon of Authenticity, “the insight that dignity contains 
the form of its decadence within itself. The Kantian dignity finally disintegrates into 
the jargon of authenticity” – if we do not see that the appeal of dignity is infinite and 
that it refers to the whole of our being – personal and natural, and therefore ultimately 
involves a stance towards all of reality. Recognition itself is not yet what it could be, 
even if we do not forget about it. 
 
Johan Siebers 
